We study pre-marital investments in a frictionless marriage market with non-transferable utility. Stochastic returns to investment eliminate the equilibrium multiplicity under deterministic returns, ensuring uniqueness of equilibrium. This equilibrium is the limit of the equilibria of a large …nite model, as the number of agents tends to in…nity. Equilibrium investments are utilitarian e¢ cient when the sexes are symmetric. However, if there is any asymmetry between the sexes, investments are generically excessive relative to Pareto-e¢ ciency. Girls will invest more than boys if their quality shocks are less variable than those for boys, or if they are the abundant sex.
Introduction
We study the incentives of parents to invest in their children when these investments also improve their marriage prospects. We assume a frictionless marriage market with nontransferable utility. It has usually been thought that ex ante investments su¤er from the hold-up problem, since a parent will not internalize the e¤ects of such investments in her own child upon the welfare of the child's future spouse. However, Peters and Siow (2002) argue that in large marriage markets where the quality of one's match depends on the level of investment, a parent has an incentive to invest more in order to improve the match of her o¤spring. They argue that the resulting outcome will be Pareto e¢ cient. This is a remarkable result, since they assume a marriage market without transferable utility. With transferable utility, Cole et al. (2001) show that in large markets, prices can provide incentives for e¢ cient investment decisions. 1 In this paper, we argue that the optimism of Peters and Siow (2002) must be somewhat tempered. When the return to investment is deterministic, we show that there is a very large set of equilibria. These include e¢ cient outcomes, but also a continuum of ine¢ cient ones. In order to overcome this embarrassment of riches, we propose a model where the returns to investment are stochastic. This is also realistic -talent risk is an important fact of life.
2 Equilibrium in this model is unique and we are therefore able to make determinate predictions. The model also allows us to address several questions of normative importance and social relevance. Are investments e¢ cient, in the absence of prices? What are the implications of biological or social di¤erences between the sexes for investment decision? What are the implications of sex ratio imbalances in countries such as China - Wei and Zhang (2011) argue that marriage market competition for scarce women underlies the high savings rate in China.
Our paper is related to the literature on matching tournaments or contests. This literature typically models a situation where there is a …xed set of prizes, and agents on the one side of the market compete by making investments, with prizes being allocated to agents according the rank order of their investments (see for example, Cole et al., 1992 and Hopkins and Kornienko, 2004 . If the "prizes" derive no utility from these investments, e.g. when the prize is social status, then an agent's investment exerts a negative positional externality on the other side of the market, so that there is over-investment. On the other hand, if the "prizes"derive utility from these investments -for example, if men compete for a set of women with …xed qualities, or students compete for university places -then either over-investment or under-investment is possible, depending on how much these investments 1 To appreciate the degree of transferability required, note that Mailath et al. (2010) show that one needs "personalized prices", which depend upon buyer characteristics as well as seller characteristics, in order ensure e¢ ciency of investments. Felli and Roberts (2001) show that even in large …nite markets, the hold-up problem may not disappear if the speci…city of investments does not vanish.
2 Recent studies of the inter-generational transmission of wealth, in the tradition of Becker and Tomes (1979) , …nd an inter-generational wealth correlation of 0.4 in the United States, which is far from 1. are valued (Cole et al., 2001; Hopkins, 2012) .
In our context, investments are two-sided -the investments of men are valued by women and symmetrically, the investments of women are valued by men. Men do not care directly about how their investments are valued by women, they care only about the consequent improvement in match quality that they get. Women are in a similar situation, since they care only about the improvement in the quality of men that they might get. One might expect therefore, that this could give rise to under-investment or over-investment, depending on parameter values. Surprisingly, our model yields clear conclusions. Under very special circumstances, when the sexes are completely symmetric, with identical distributions of shocks and a balanced sex ratio, investments will be e¢ cient -not merely in the Pareto sense, but also from a utilitarian standpoint. However, if there are any di¤erences between the sexes, whether it be di¤ering returns to investments, di¤erent stochastic shocks or an unequal sex ratio, investments are generically excessive, as compared to Pareto-e¢ cient investments. Since the intuition for the overinvestment result is somewhat subtle, and quite distinct from that in one-sided tournaments with positional externalities, we defer explaining this until the model is introduced.
The rest of the paper is set out as follows. Section 2 discusses the issues arising with a model with deterministic returns and other related literature. Section 3 sets out the model with noisy investments, and shows that a pure strategy equilibrium exists and is unique for general quality functions. We consider, in turn, additive and multiplicative shocks, and our main …nding is that investments are generically excessive, relative to Pareto e¢ ciency. We use our model to examine the observational implications of gender di¤erences, and show that if talent shocks are more dispersed for boys than for girls, then girls will invest more than boys. We also examine the e¤ects of sex ratio imbalances on investments (otherwise, in most of the paper, we focus on the case of a balanced sex ratio). Section 4 shows that when there are no gender di¤erences, then investments are e¢ cient, even if there is heterogeneity within each sex. Section 5 provides a …nite agent justi…cation for the continuum model that forms the bulk of the paper. We examine a model with …nitely many agents, where there is uncertainty as to whether men will be excess, or women will be in excess. If the number of agents is large enough, there is a unique equilibrium that converges to the equilibrium of the continuum model. The …nal section concludes. The appendix contains proofs that are omitted in the text.
Motivation and Related Literature
The fundamental problem is the following: investment in a child bene…ts the child's future spouse, but the bene…t to the spouse is not considered by the child's parents. There is therefore a gap between the privately optimal investment in a child, which we denote x, and the socially optimal level which is naturally greater. In the absence of prices, it is not clear that there are incentives for e¢ cient investment. Peters and Siow (2002) (PS, henceforth) argue that nonetheless, equilibrium investments are socially e¢ cient.
Let us consider the PS model, of investment with deterministic returns, but simplify by assuming that families are identical rather than di¤ering in wealth. Assume a unit measure of boys, all of whom are ex ante identical, and an equal measure of girls, who are similarly ex ante identical. Assume that the quality of the child, as assessed by a partner in the marriage market, equals the level of parental investment, x. Suppose a boy is matched with a girl. The utility of the boy's parents is increasing in the investment level of the girl x G , but they have to bear the cost of investment x B in their son. Thus, if they choose x B purely to maximize their utility, they would choose only the privately optimal investment x B . But the resulting investment levels ( x B ; x G ) are ine¢ cient. Both families would be better o¤ if they each raised their investments.
Suppose that the family of the boy believes that if they choose investment level x B , the quality of their partner is given by a smooth, strictly increasing function, (x B ). They would choose investments to maximize their overall payo¤, given the return function . Suppose also that the family of a girl believe that the match quality of their girl is also an increasing function of their own investment level x G . Assume further that this return function equals 1 (x G ), the inverse of that for the boys. 3 Consider a pro…le of investments (x B ; x G ) such that x B maximizes the payo¤s of the boy's family given returns (x B ), x G maximizes the payo¤s of the girl's family given returns 1 (x G ), and x B = 1 (x G ), i.e. these expectations are actually realized. As PS argue, the pro…le (x B ; x G ) must be such that the indi¤erence curves on the two sides of the market are mutually tangent, so that the investment pro…le must be Pareto-e¢ cient.
A problem with this approach is that, while the expectations (x B ) are realized in equilibrium, they cannot be realized if the family of a boy chooses x B 6 = x B . In particular, if a boy deviates and chooses x B < x B , the match (x B ) < x G is not feasible since every girl in the market has quality x G . In other words, while expectations are "rational" at the equilibrium, they are not so for any investment level that is not chosen in equilibrium.
We shall be explicit in this paper about the matching process that follows a pro…le of investments. Speci…cally, we will require the matching to be feasible, to be stable (in the sense of Gale and Shapley, 1962) and to be measure preserving. Despite these restrictions on matching o¤ the equilibrium path, in terms of equilibria there is an embarrassment of riches, and a large set of equilibria. Let (x B ; x G ) be a pair of investments that are weakly greater 3 If the return function for the girls is the inverse of that for the boys, then whenever a boy raises his investment from x B to x 0 B and …nds that his partner quality rises from x G to x 0 G , it must also be the case that when a girl raises her investment from x G to x 0 G , her partner quality increases from x B to x 0 B . This property ensures e¢ ciency of investments. than the individually optimal investments ( x B ; x G ), and where the payo¤ of gender i from being matched with a partner with investment level x j is weakly greater than the payo¤ from choosing the individually optimal investment level x i and being unmatched. Any such pair can be supported as an equilibrium, by specifying that any agent who deviates to a lower investment level will be left unmatched. In the PS equilibrium, an individual making an e¢ cient investment can expect to be matched with someone who invests similarly, there is in e¤ect symmetry. However, here, if the parent of a boy deviates upwards, and chooses a higher level of investment, his son cannot realize a higher match quality, since all the girls are choosing x G . We therefore have a "folk theorem"-any pair of investments satisfying the above conditions is an equilibrium. E¢ cient investments are an equilibrium, but so are ine¢ cient ones. 4 Turning now to the original PS environment where families di¤er in wealth, and thereby in their marginal costs of investment, we still …nd a continuum of ine¢ cient equilibria. The equilibria we have constructed in the homogenous case are strict equilibria -any individual who invests di¤erently does strictly worse. If we perturb wealth levels slightly, and wealth a¤ects payo¤s continuously, then these equilibria will continue to be strict. The only thing that is required is that the distribution of wealth is not too dispersed, so that there is a common level of investment that is not so low that it is below the richest family's privately optimal investment and not so high that the poorest family would prefer to deviate downwards and be unmatched. None of these equilibria are e¢ cient. In fact, for all of them, a measure zero of agents make an e¢ cient investment. Ifx is relatively low then all agents underinvest. Ifx is higher, some agents underinvest and some overinvest. One can also construct ine¢ cient equilibria, with a heterogeneity of investment levels, even when wealth is more widely dispersed.
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Our paper shows that these problems can be resolved if we augment the model by adding an idiosyncratic element of match quality. This ensures that there is always an nondegenerate distribution of qualities on both sides of the market, thereby providing incentives to invest. Furthermore, equilibrium is unique, under some regularity conditions. Before proceeding to the model, we review some of the related literature not already discussed in the introduction. Peters (2007) investigates two sided investments with …nitely many agents. He assumes that individuals on the long side of the market may drop out of the market with some small probability, 6 and solves for an equilibrium in mixed strategies. Peters (2009) assumes that 4 Equilibrium multiplicity also holds if the deviator is left unmatched with probability one-half, rather than for sure. This matching rule can be justi…ed in a large …nite model (see Section 5).
5 For example, we may divide families into two groups, rich and poor, each of which groups has a common level of investment. The matching rule matches those families with sons who choose investmentx L to those families with daughters with the same investment, and matches those who choosex H to daughters with the same investment.
6 This works in a similar way to the uncertainty over participant numbers assumed in Section 5 of the current paper.
there is ex ante heterogeneity, rather than the noisy returns assumed in this paper. In both papers equilibrium investments are bounded away from the e¢ cient level even as the number of participants goes to in…nity. Hoppe et al. (2009) analyze a signaling model of matching, where an agent cares about his or her match partner's underlying characteristic which is private information. Again there is ex ante heterogeneity rather than stochastic returns. Since investments are not directly valued, they are inherently wasteful, although they may improve allocative e¢ ciency in the matching process. They also obtain a interesting comparative statics results, on gender di¤erences and on the numbers of participants, that we relate to our own results. Hopkins (2012) …nds that with one-sided investments, the level of investment can be ine¢ ciently low.
Our approach di¤ers from most of the theoretical literature on investments, which usually assumes ex ante heterogeneity or incomplete information (Hoppe et al. (2009 ), Peters (2009 and Hopkins (2012) ). Agents are assumed to di¤er ex ante in terms of quality or wealth, giving rise to heterogeneity in investments. Instead, we build on the classic work of Lazear and Rosen (1981) , who analyze a tournament where a …nite number of identical workers compete for exogenously given prizes. By assuming that worker's output is noisy, they ensure that the optimization problem faced by the worker is smooth. Models with noisy returns face the di¢ culty that the optimization problem faced by the agent is not necessarily concave. By assuming that the noise is large enough, Lazear and Rosen ensure that the e¤ort level that satis…es the …rst order condition is also globally optimal. With two-sided investments, our problems is somewhat more delicate, since it is the relative dispersion that matters. Increasing dispersion on one side, say men, aggravates the problem of large deviations on the women's side. One of our contributions is to show how this analysis may be extended to two sided matching and investments, and also to a situation where the number of agents is large. Gall et al. (2009) also employ a model with noisy returns to investments, and examine investments, matching and a¢ rmative action in a non-transferable utility setting. They consider a situation where e¢ ciency requires negative assortative matching, but where stable matchings are positively assortative, providing a possible rationale for a¢ rmative action. They allow for investments with stochastic returns and focus on the tradeo¤ between the positive role of a¢ rmative action on match e¢ ciency versus its possible negative e¤ect upon investment incentives.
In empirical work on matching, typically the value of any match is assumed to have an idiosyncratic random element (see, for example, Dagsvik (2000) and Choo and Siow, 2006) . Our key …nding here is that the structure of shocks not only a¤ects the matching process, but is also critical for investment incentives. The transferable utility model is an alternative paradigm that can be used to explain several empirical phenomena. Chiappori et al. (2009) use this model to explain the increasing education of women, while Iyigun and Walsh (2007) study the distributional consequences of institutional and gender di¤erences for investments. While transferable utility models are very useful, there are many reasons for the limited transferability of utility in the marriage context, including the inability to commit to future transfers at the time of marriage.
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Finally, there is also work that considers investment incentives in the presence of search frictions -Acemoglu and Shimer (1999) study one-sided investments under transferable utility, while Burdett and Coles (2001) analyze a non-transferable utility model with twosided investments.
A Matching Tournament with Noisy Investments
We now set out a model where the return to investments are stochastic. To simplify the analysis, we assume that there is no ex ante heterogeneity but there are stochastic returns so that there is heterogeneity ex post. Thus, all families are ex ante identical, save for the fact that some have boys and others have girls. We assume a balanced sex ratio and a continuum population, so that there are equal measures of boys and girls. Our main result in this section is to show that under these assumptions, and under certain technical conditions, a pure strategy equilibrium exists and is unique.
Assume that a parent i derives a direct private bene…t b B (x) from an investment of x in the quality of a boy, and b G (x) in the quality of a girl and incurs a costc B (x) andc G (x) respectively. De…ne the net cost of investment in a boy as c B (x) =c B (x) b B (x), and assume that this is strictly convex and eventually increasing. Net costs for girls are similarly de…ned. The quality of a boy, q, depends upon the level of parental investment, x, and the realization of a random shock, ", that is distributed with a density function f (") and a cumulative distribution function F (") on ["; "]. Let denote the realization of the idiosyncratic quality component for a girl; this is distributed with a density function g and cdf G on [ ; ]. We shall assume that the quality of a boy equals q(x; "), where q is continuous and strictly increasing in both arguments. Similarly, a girl's quality on the marriage market is given by q(x; ). It is easy to see that our analysis also applies when partners valuation of quality is an increasing concave function of q. We assume that the "quality"from being unmatched, u, is strictly less than the payo¤ from the lowest possible quality match. Note that matched or unmatched, the individual still pays the investment cost Parents are altruistic and internalize the e¤ects of their decisions on the utility of their own child, but not on the utility of their child's partner. Thus if a girl with parental investment x G and shock is matched with a boy whose parent has invested x B , and who has shock realization ", her payo¤ and that of her parents equals
Similarly for a boy of type (x B ; ") who is matched with a girl of type (x G ; ), his utility would be
The payo¤ for an unmatched individual is u c i (x i ) where i 2 fG; Bg.
Let x B and x G denote the individually optimal or Nash investments for boys and girls respectively. That is, for boys it is the investment that minimizes c B (x) =c B (x) b B (x), or equivalently the investment such that c 0 B ( x B ) = 0. The privately optimal investment for girls x G is de…ned similarly.
Such investments are not Pareto e¢ cient. Consider a social planner who chooses (x B ; x G ) to maximize
for some 2 (0; 1), where is the relative weight placed on the welfare of girls. Di¤erenti-ating with respect to x B and x G , setting to zero and rearranging, we obtain the …rst order conditions for Pareto e¢ ciency,
Rearranging the …rst order condition for welfare maximization, we obtain
In other words, any pro…le of Pareto-e¢ cient investments satis…es this condition, irrespective of the value of . Pareto e¢ cient investments always exceed the privately optimal level as the under the privately optimal investments, we have c
, whereas the right hand side of equation (6) is strictly positive. Of particular interest is the case where , the weight place on girls'welfare, is equal to their proportion in the population, one-half. Let x B ; x G denote the e¢ cient investments in this case. We shall call these the utilitarian e¢ cient investments. These are the investments that parents would like the social planner to choose in the "original position", before the gender of their child is realized.
The Pareto e¢ ciency condition (6) does not determine a unique investment level, but a continuous curve in (x B ; x G ) space. If a pro…le of investments (x B ; x G ) is such that the product of the marginal costs is strictly greater than the right hand side of equation (6), and the marginal costs are positive, 8 then such a point lies above the Pareto e¢ ciency curve. We say that have overinvestment relative to Pareto-e¢ ciency, since it is possible to achieve Pareto e¢ ciency by reducing either investment level. 9 Similarly, if the product of marginal costs is strictly less than the right hand side of the equation, we have underinvestment relative to Pareto-e¢ ciency.
On the other hand, utilitarian e¢ ciency determines a unique point in (x B ; x G ) space. Thus we may consider the investments of one side alone, say boys, and speak of underinvestment relative to the utilitarian level, without reference to the investments by girls. Thus, by the utilitarian criterion, one may have underinvestment by boys and overinvestment by girls. By the Pareto criterion, one can only have overinvestment or underinvestment, where this statement applies to the pro…le of investments, (x B ; x G ).
We shall focus upon pure strategy Nash equilibria where every parent on a given side of the marriage market chooses the same level of investment. Such an equilibrium will be called quasi-symmetric and consists of a pair (x B ; x G ). We require the matching to be stable and measure preserving. Given our speci…cation of preferences, whereby all boys uniformly prefer girls of higher quality, and vice-versa, a stable measure preserving matching is essentially unique, and must be assortative. Since q is strictly increasing in the idiosyncratic shock, and since all agents on the same side of the market choose the same investment level, in equilibrium, there must be matching according to the idiosyncratic shocks alone. For a boy who has shock realization ", let (") denote the value of of his match. This satis…es
or (") = G 1 (F (")). That is, if boy is of rank z in the boy's distribution, he is matched with a girl of the same rank z in the girl's distribution. The non-degenerate distribution of qualities on both sides of the marriage market provides incentives of investment above the privately optimal level. If the parent of a boy invests a little more than x B , he increases the boy's rank for any realization of ". By doing so, he obtains a girl of higher rank. However, he is concerned not with the girl's rank but her quality.
One delicate issue concerns large deviations from the equilibrium, where the quality realization is outside the support of the equilibrium distribution of qualities. For example, if a boy deviates upwards and his quality exceeds q(x B ; "), stability implies that he will be matched with the best quality girl, of quality q(x G ; ). If he deviates downwards and his quality is below q(x B ; "), then stability implies that he could be left unmatched (with 8 No individual will choose investment below the individually optimal level, since higher investments can never reduce match quality. Thus we may restrict attention to investment levels such that marginal costs are non-negative. 9 This follows from the concavity of q(:) in x and the strict convexity of c B (:) and c G (:). If we reduce x B then the left hand side of (6) decreases due to the strict convexity of the cost function, while the …rst term on the right-hand side increases, since q xx (x B ; ") 0 by Assumption A2 in the appendix. Since c 0 B ( x B ) = 0, there exists a reduction in x B such that (6) holds. payo¤ u) or matched with the lowest quality girl. We shall assume that both these outcomes have equal probability. Since we assume that being single has a low payo¤, this deters large downward deviations. These assumptions are consistent with the requirement that the matching be stable and measure preserving. Moreover, the matching assumption can be justi…ed as the limit of a model with a …nite number of agents as the number of agents tends to in…nity, as we show in Section 5, where we consider a model where the exact numbers of men and women is random: with probability one-half that there are slightly more men than women, and probability one-half the reverse is the case. Then a boy with the lowest quality is unmatched with probability one-half.
In the Appendix we show that the …rst order condition for the equilibrium investment in boys can be written as
The intuition for the …rst order condition is that it balances the marginal cost c 0 of extra investment on the right hand side with its marginal bene…t on the left hand side. The latter principally is determined by the possibility of an improved match from increased investment. Speci…cally, an increase in ", a boy's shock, would improve his match, given the matching relation (7) at rate 0 = f =g. Similarly, the …rst order condition for investment in girls is given by
The match value of remaining single, u , does not a¤ect the …rst order condition for equilibrium investments, and thus does not a¤ect the equilibrium level. This is so since in equilibrium, an individual is always matched with probability one when the sex ratio is balanced. Furthermore, we assume that the density function of shocks is zero at its lower bound, ensuring that u does not a¤ect the derivative of the payo¤ function at equilibrium. However, the value of u does a¤ect the payo¤ from large downward deviations, and we assume a "misery e¤ect", i.e. that u is su¢ ciently small relative to the payo¤ from being matched.
10 This ensures that large downward deviations are not pro…table.
We also have to ensure that large upward deviations are not pro…table -this is not immediate, since the optimization problem faced by agents is not necessarily quasi-concave, just as in Lazear and Rosen (1981) . 11 We assume throughout that the investment cost 10 The total payo¤ to a boy from being single equals u c B (x B ). This incorporates the private bene…t from investment, since c B (x B ) =c B (x B ) b B (x B ) measures the cost net of the private bene…t.
11 In a one-sided tournament it su¢ ces to assume that shocks a¤ecting that side are su¢ ciently dispersed and that the cost function is convex. In a two-sided tournament, it is the relative dispersion on the two sides that matters, and one cannot make shocks relatively dispersed for both sides. See the discussion of the log-normal example in Subsection 3.1.3. functions c B (x) and c G (x) are twice di¤erentiable and strictly convex. In addition, we invoke, the following assumption: A1 ensures that the overall payo¤ is strictly concave if an agent deviates upwards -the bene…t function is concave if (a) or (b) hold, while (c) ensures that the cost function is convex enough to overcome any non-concavity in the bene…t function. We also require more standard technical assumptions, Assumption A2,on the concavity of the quality function, and upon the distributions of shocks. These are set out in the Appendix, as is the proof of the theorem. Nonetheless, we are able to show existence and uniqueness of a quasi-symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies.
Theorem 1 Under Assumptions A1 and A2 there is a unique quasi-symmetric Nash equilibrium of the matching tournament, provided that the value to not being matched ( u) is su¢ ciently low. Now that existence has been established, we can turn to some important questions about the qualitative nature of equilibrium behavior. Are investments Pareto-e¢ cient? What are the factors that lead one sex to invest more than the other? In order to shed more light on these questions, we consider, in turn, di¤erent speci…cations of the quality function q( ).
Additive Shocks
We …rst analyze the case where q(x; ") = x + ". One interpretation is that investment or bequest are in the form of …nancial assets or real estate, while the shocks are to (permanent) labor income of the child. The interpretation is that total household income is like a public good (as in Peters-Siow), which both partners share.
Consider a quasi-symmetric equilibrium where all boys invest x B and all girls invest x G . A boy with shock realization " and of rank z in the distribution F (:) will be matched with a girl of shock (") with same rank z in G(:). Suppose that the parent of a boy invests a little more, x B + , as in Figure 1 . If his realized shock is ", the improvement in the ranking of boys is approximately equal to f (") . The improvement in the quality of the matched girl, must be such that g( )~ f (") , i.e. the improvement in the rank of his match must
Figure 1: If a boy with shock realization " increases investment by an amount , he would overtake other boys with shock realizations between " and " + . The boy's match would improve from the girl with shock value (") to one at (" + ).
equal the improvement in his own rank. Thus the marginal return to investment in terms of match quality equals
at any value of ".
Integrating over all possible values of " gives the …rst order condition for optimal investments in boys,
Similarly, the …rst order condition for investment in girls is
The left hand side of the above equations (the marginal bene…t) is constant, while the right hand side is strictly increasing in x i , due to the convexity of the cost function. Thus, there is a unique solution to the …rst order conditions.
E¢ ciency
We now use the …rst order conditions (10) and (11) to examine the e¢ ciency of investments. Under additive shocks, the marginal bene…t to a girl from a boy's investment is one, regardless of the realization of the shock. Thus the Pareto e¢ ciency conditions (4) and (5) Suppose F = G, i.e. the distribution of shocks is the same. Thus,
Investments are utilitarian e¢ cient even if the investment cost functions are di¤erent for the two sexes. As we shall see later, this is an example of a more general result -if there are no gender di¤erences whatsoever, this ensures utilitarian e¢ ciency. In general, if there are any di¤erences between the sexes,
will di¤er from 1, and so one cannot expect utilitarian e¢ ciency. The following theorem sharpens this conclusion.
Theorem 2 When noise is additive, in a quasi-symmetric equilibrium investments are generically excessive relative to Pareto e¢ ciency.
Proof. It is useful to make the following change in variables in the …rst order condition for the girls, (11). Since = ("),
Thus the …rst order condition for girls is rewritten as
Consider the product of the two …rst order conditions:
By the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality,
The Cauchy-Schwarz states that the inequality is strict if the two terms are linearly independent. Thus c
and p g( (")) are linearly independent functions of ". Since Pareto e¢ ciency requires c 0 (x B ) c 0 (x G ) = 1, we have overinvestment generically if the distributions f and g di¤er.
Example 1 Let us assume that F (") = " on [0; 1], i.e. " is uniformly distributed.
12 As-
n . The equilibrium conditions are:
The product of the marginal costs equals n 2 2n 1 > 1 for n > 1=2 and n 6 = 1. E¢ ciency requires that the product equals 1, which it only does for n = 1, i.e. when f = g.
The example provides additional intuition for the ine¢ ciency result. Let n = 2, so that the density function for women, g( ) = 2 on [0; 1]. The incentive for investment for a man at any value of " depends upon the ratio of the densities,
. This ratio exceeds one for low values of ", but is less than one for high values of ". Conversely, for women, the incentive to invest depends upon the inverse of this ratio,
, which is low at low values of but high at high values of . In other words, the ratio of the densities plays opposite roles for the two sexes. However, the weights with which these ratios are aggregated di¤ers between the sexes; high values of are given relatively large weight in the case of women, since g( ) is large in this case, while they are given relatively less weight in the case of men.
Gender Di¤erences
We use our model to examine a contentious issue -what are the implications of gender di¤erences. Let us assume that the shocks to quality constitute talent shocks, and that quality is additive in talent and investment (our results in this section also apply when quality is multiplicative). One issue, that excites great controversy, is whether the distributions di¤er for men and women. For example, Baron-Cohen (2004) and Pinker (2003) argue that there are intrinsic gender di¤erences that are rooted in biology, while Fine (2010) has attacked this view. In any case, in a study based on test scores of 15-year-olds from 41 OECD countries, Machin and Pekkarinen (2008) …nd that boys show greater variance than girls in both reading and mathematics test scores in most countries. We now explore the implications of di¤erences in variability between the sexes.
Suppose that the shocks are more variable for men than for women. One way to formalize the idea of a distribution being more variable than another is the dispersive order. A distribution F is larger in the dispersive order than a distribution F , or
with the inequality being strict on a set of z values with positive measure (see Shaked and Shanthikumar (2007, pp148-9) ). For example, if F and G are both uniform distributions, where the support of F is a longer interval than that of G, then F d G. A second example is two normal distributions -the one with the higher variance is larger in the dispersive order. These measures of dispersive order do not rely upon an equality of means (see Hopkins and Kornienko (2010) for further examples and discussion).
1 for all values of ", and is strictly less on a set values of " of positive measure. Thus the integral on the left-hand side of equation (10) is strictly less than one, and the integral on the left-hand side of equation (11) is strictly greater than one. As utilitarian e¢ ciency requires c
, boys under-invest and girls over-invest, relative to the utilitarian level. We therefore have the following proposition:
Proposition 1 With additive shocks, if the distribution of shocks for boys is more dispersed than that for girls, that is F d G, then there is under-investment in boys and there is over-investment in girls relative to the utilitarian e¢ cient level.
The intuition for this result is as follows. If the distribution of shocks for boys is relatively dispersed, then at any realization of ", a increment in his investment only results in a small improvement in his rank, and thus of his partner. Since the quality of the girls is relatively compressed, this improvement in the rank of his partner only translates to a small increase in quality. In contrast, for a girl, an increment in investment results in a large improvement in her rank, and this improvement in the rank of her partner also translates to a large increase in quality, given the higher dispersion in boy qualities. Therefore in equilibrium investment in girls is greater than in boys.
Empirically, the average performance of girls in school is often better than that of boys, especially in developed countries, where there is less discrimination. Our model provides a possible partial explanation for this -the incentives to invest for girls are greater, from marriage market matching considerations. While di¤erences in the dispersion of shocks have strong implications, di¤erences in the mean play no role in investment incentives. To see this, suppose that f is a translation of g, i.e. f (") = g(" + k) for some k. This implies that
= 1 for every ". Investments will be utilitarian e¢ cient, and this di¤erence in average quality has no implications for investment incentives.
Normal or Log-Normal Shocks
Suppose that the shocks are normally distributed, i.e. " N ( " ; " ) and N ( ; ).
, and G( ) = , where denotes the standard normal cdf.
Thus the matching (") is linear, and
at all values of ". Furthermore, linearity of the matching implies that 0 (" + ) is constant and equal to " , implying that agents's optimization is strictly concave as long as the cost function is convex. Since shocks are unbounded, an agent is always matched even when he deviates downwards, and the misery e¤ect plays no role in deterring downward deviations. The …rst order conditions for investment are c
Investments are always Pareto e¢ cient but will not be utilitarian e¢ cient if the variances di¤er. If one measures the degree of over or under investment relative to the utilitarian level by the associated marginal costs, and if " > , then the overinvestment by girls, relative to the utilitarian level, is proportional to the ratio of the standard deviations.
Our analysis can be extended to the case where an increasing function of the shocks is normally distributed. For example, consider log-normal shocks, so that ln(") N (0; " ) and ln( ) N (0; ). The …rst order conditions for investment (see the Appendix for derivation) are given by
As in the normal case, the ratio of the marginal costs is related to ratio of the variances. However, here we have c
so that the outcome is neither utilitarian or even Pareto e¢ cient unless " = . The extent of ine¢ ciency is related to the di¤erence in variances.
Finally, note that our general existence theorem does not apply to these examples since it assumes bounded shocks. In the normal case, linearity of the matching su¢ ces to ensure that the maximization problem is strictly concave. The Appendix shows that large upward deviations are not pro…table in the log-normal case under plausible assumptions on the ratio of variances and the convexity of costs. Thus our analysis can be extended more generally, beyond the class of distributions satisfying Assumption A1, if one assumes explicit forms for the distribution of shocks.
Sex Ratio Imbalances
Sex ratio imbalances are an important phenomenon in countries such as China and parts of India. These imbalances are extremely large in China, where it is estimated that one in …ve boys born in the 2000 census will be unable to …nd a marriage partner (see Bhaskar, 2011) . Wei and Zhang (2011) argue that the high savings rate in China is partly attributable to the sex ratio imbalance. They argue that parents of boys feel compelled to invest more, in order to improve their chances of …nding a partner, thus raising the overall savings rate. However, one might conjecture that this might be counter-balanced by the reduced pressure felt by the parents of girls. We therefore turn to our model to provide an answer to this question.
Assume that each sex is ex ante identical, and let the relative measure of girls equal r < 1. At the matching stage, since r 1, all girls should be matched, and the highest quality boys should be matched. Since every girl is matched, the investment in her generates bene…ts for herself and for her partner (for sure). Thus the …rst best investment level in a girl, x G , satis…es c 0 (x G ) = 1. Now consider investment in a boy. If we assume that the idiosyncratic component of match values is su¢ ciently small, then welfare optimality requires that only a fraction r of boys invest, and that their investments also satisfy c 0 ( ) = 1. However, if we restrict attention to symmetric investment strategies, then investment will take place in all boys, and since investment occurs before " is realized, each boy has a probability r of being matched, and thus the utilitarian e¢ cient level of investment in a boy, x B , must satisfy c 0 (x B ) = r, i.e. the marginal cost must equal the expected marginal bene…t. Similarly, the condition for Pareto e¢ ciency, with arbitrary weights on the welfare of boys and girls is
We now turn to equilibrium. Suppose that all boys invest the same amount x B and all girls invest the same amount x G . Since only the top r fraction of boys will be matched, this corresponds to those having a realization of " " where F (") = 1 r. In this case, a boy of type " " will be matched with a girl of type ("; r), where
The derivative of this matching function is given by
That is, an increase in " increases a boy's match quality relatively more quickly, since the distribution of girls is relatively thinner, since r < 1.
Those boys with realizations below" will not be matched and receive a payo¤ u < , what we have called the misery e¤ect. As Hajnal (1982) has noted, in Asian societies such as China and India, marriage rates have historically been extremely high (over 99%, as compared to the traditional "European marriage pattern"with marriage rates around 90%). Thus the misery e¤ect is likely to be large in Asian societies.
The …rst order condition for boys in an equilibrium where all boys invest the same amount x B , while all girls invest the same amount x G is given by
As compared to our previous analysis, we notice two di¤erences. The …rst term is the improvement in match quality, and the sparseness of girls increases the investment incentives, due to the term in 1=r. Additionally, an increment in investment raises the probability of one's son getting matched, at a rate f ("), and the marginal payo¤ equals the di¤erence between matching with worst quality girl and receiving + x G , and not being matched and receiving u. An unbalanced sex ratio tends to amplify investments in boys, for two reasons. First, a given increment in investment pushes boys more quickly up the distribution of girls, and second, there is an incentive to invest in order to increase the probability of match taking place at all, since there is discontinuous payo¤ loss from not being matched at", due to the misery e¤ect.
Similarly, the …rst order condition for investment in girls is given by
Notice here that the role of r < 1 is to reduce investment incentives, since an increment in investment pushes a girl more slowly up the distribution of boy qualities. Furthermore, there is no counterpart to the misery e¤ect for the scarcer sex, and the only reason to invest arises from the consequent improvement in match quality.
Since girls are in excess supply, a girl whose parents invest and whose quality realization is discretely lower than every other girl will still be able to …nd a partner. Such a girl will get a match payo¤ of x B +", no matter how low her own quality. Thus, the conditions for the existence of a quasi-symmetric equilibrium are more stringent than in the balanced sex ratio case. Large downward deviations in investment will not be pro…table provided that the dispersion in the qualities of boys is su¢ ciently large, and the cost function for girls is su¢ ciently convex.
Proposition 2 If r < 1 and the noise is additive, there exists a unique quasi-symmetric equilibrium, provided that f (:) is su¢ ciently dispersed and c B (:) is su¢ ciently convex. Investments are excessive relative to Pareto e¢ ciency, for any distributions of noise.
It is worth pointing out that even absent the misery e¤ect, there will be strictly excessive investments, even if the noise distributions are identical, unless they happen to be uniform. When r < 1, g( (")) is not a linear transformation of f (") unless f and g are uniform. Thus investment will be strictly greater than the e¢ cient level.
As we have already noted, if F and G have the same distributions, and r = 1, investments are utilitarian e¢ cient. Thus a balanced sex ratio is su¢ cient to ensure e¢ ciency of investments in this case. This provides an additional argument for the optimality of a balanced sex ratio, over and above the congestion externality identi…ed in Bhaskar (2011) .
We may use our model to evaluate the theoretical basis of the empirical work by Wei and Zhang (2011) , attributing the high savings rate in China to the sex ratio imbalance. Note …rst of all that, given the condition for utilitarian e¢ ciency c 0 (x B ) = r, investment in boys should actually fall as r decrease below one. In the related signalling model of Hoppe et al. (2009) it already has been shown that an increase in the number of men will increase total signalling by men but the e¤ect on signalling by women is ambiguous and depends on the shape of the distribution of abilities amongst men. The shape of the distribution also matters for our model, but a further di¢ culty here is that investment by one side a¤ects the incentives to invest by the other. In particular, the equilibrium choice of investment by girls enters the boys'…rst order condition (14). This potentially would also make the investment by boys respond ambiguously to the sex ratio becoming less equal.
As an example, consider the case where f and g are increasing and f (") = g( ) = 0. We have
and because g is increasing and both and the range of integration ["(r); "] are increasing in r, it follows that investment by girls is unambiguously increasing in r. Similarly,
and because f is assumed increasing and 1 is decreasing in r, overall this expression in decreasing in r. That is the matching incentive for boys increases as the sex ratio becomes more uneven. However, the overall e¤ect on boys'investments is ambiguous, as the LHS of (14) also depends on x G which is increasing in r. One can at least conclude that for r close to one, so that" is close to " and f (") is close to zero, x B is decreasing in r.
In summary, under some assumptions, an increasingly uneven sex ratio can indeed increase investment incentives for men. In contrast, this change will decrease incentives for women. The predicted e¤ect on total investment is consequently ambiguous. However, precisely because the change towards an uneven gender ratio increases the relative weight of boys in the population, their increased investment may be enough to increase the total.
Talent Shocks and Complementarities with Investment
Consider next the case where investment is in education and the uncertainty is talent risk. It is plausible that the return to investment depends upon the talent of the child. To model this, we suppose that quality is given by a multiplicative production function, q(x; ") = x". All our results apply to a more general Cobb-Douglas form, q(x; ") = x " ; we can rede…ne a new random variable" = " , and investmentsx = x , and the results that follow will apply. With this production function, q x = " and q " = x, so that the …rst order condition for equilibrium (8) and (9) can be re-written:
Unlike the additive case, the "reaction function"for the boys is upward sloping in the girl's investments, and vice versa. Intuitively, with if quality is multiplicative, an increase in the girl's investment level increases the dispersion in qualities on the girl's side, thereby increasing investment incentives for boys. However, as the Appendix shows, the reaction functions have slope less than one, so that there is a unique solution to these equations, and equilibrium is unique.
Utilitarian e¢ ciency requires c 0 B (x B ) = E(") and c 0 G (x G ) = E( ). Pareto e¢ cient investments are such that the product of the marginal costs equal E(")E( ). Consider the case where f = g. In this case, the equilibrium investments satisfy the conditions
If the cost functions are also identical, then
, so that we have utilitarian e¢ ciency. The following theorem shows that there will be generic overinvestment, if the densities are both symmetric, if they are di¤erent from each other.
Theorem 3 Suppose that quality is multiplicative and that the distributions f and g are symmetric. Then in any quasi-symmetric equilibrium investments are generically excessive relative to Pareto e¢ ciency.
This result is a robust one, in the following sense. Suppose that f and g are symmetric and linearly independent. The Cauchy-Schwarz inequality implies that investment will be strictly too high. Now if we perturb the distributions so thef is close to f andg to g, then c 0 (x B ) c 0 (x G ) will still be greater than 1, since the integrals de…ning this are continuous in the distributions. In other words, we will have excessive investments even with asymmetric distributions as long as the asymmetries are not too large.
Why does the result require that the asymmetry not be too large? To provide some intuition for this, let us return to the example where the distribution of shocks is uniform on [0; 1] for men and where the density function for women, g( ) = 2 on [0; 1]. Here again, the ratio of the densities that is relevant for men,
, is relatively large when " is low. While these values of " still have large weight (since f (") is constant in "), in the multiplicative case, the payo¤ to investment is low when " is small. Under symmetry, neither particularly low values nor particularly high values of " have any special weight and thus the ine¢ ciency result applies.
We now examine the implications of gender di¤erences in the multiplicative case.
Proposition 3 Assume that multiplicative shocks that have the same mean for boys and girls, and identical cost functions for the two sexes. If the distribution of shocks for boys is more dispersed than that for girls, that is F d G, then there is under-investment in boys and there is over-investment in girls relative to the utilitarian e¢ cient level.
Proof. From the …rst order conditions, if
Since E(") = E( ) and the cost functions are the same, we must have c
Multiplicative shocks have the interesting implication that an increase in investment by one side, say girls, also increases the dispersion in quality amongst girls, thereby providing more incentives to invest for the boys. So if shocks are relatively less variable amongst girls, the induced investments are such that the resulting di¤erence in variability in quality between the two sides is less pronounced. Since girls invest more and boys invest less, this raises quality dispersion amongst girls, and reduces it amongst boys. Both the additive model and the multiplicative model show that the side with more dispersed shocks has weaker incentives for investment. A similar argument is also found in Hoppe et al. (2009) , where di¤erences in the dispersion of exogenously given unobserved qualities a¤ect signalling expenditures by men and women. The additive shocks model yields conclusions similar to Hoppe et al., since investments by one side do not a¤ect investment incentives on the other side. The multiplicative model is richer, since increased investments by girls raise the incentives to invest for boys.
These interaction e¤ects have interesting implications also when the mean value of shocks di¤ers between the sexes. Suppose that F (") = G(" + k) for some k > 0, so that average quality is higher amongst the girls, but the distributions are of the same type. An example would be where shocks are normally distributed, with the girls having a higher mean. Since
= 1 for all values of " the …rst order conditions reduce to
From the …rst order conditions, we see that women invest more than men. However, the interaction e¤ects imply that women invest less than the utilitarian e¢ cient amount, and men invest more than the utilitarian level. Thus, in the multiplicative case, investment behavior partially o¤sets di¤erences in mean quality.
Finally, the multiplicative model also shows us that facilitating investment by one side, say girls, also increases investment incentives for boys. In some developing countries such as India, government have sought to overcome discrimination against girls by subsidizing their education. Increased investment in girls raises the dispersion in their quality, thereby providing greater incentives to invest for the boys.
Investments under Traditional Gender Roles
Suppose that shocks are additive for women but multiplicative for men. One example is a traditional society, where women do not work, and so investment in them takes the form of a dowry; while parents invest in their sons'human capital. This interpretation …ts our model if investments towards dowries must take place in advance, i.e. parents must forgo consumption in order to save for their daughter's dowry. The …rst order condition for investments in boys is 1
Notice that this is independent of the investment level of the girls, since the quality of girls is additive. On the other hand, since the dispersion of qualities amongst the boys increases with their investment level, the investment by girls is increasing in boys'investments, as the girls'…rst order condition shows:
This mixed model can provide an explanation for why dowries may increase during the process of development, as for example in India. 13 Suppose that the marginal costs of investing in human capital fall, so that c 0 B (x B ) is reduced at any value of x B . From (18), x B must go up. From (19), x G also increases. Intuitively, the increased investment by boys increases the variability in their quality, thereby increasing the incentives for the parents of girls for investing in their dowries. A similar argument can also be made if the return to human capital goes up -this will increase investment levels by boys, increasing the dispersion in their qualities. The increased dispersion in boy qualities increases the investment incentives for girls. Our overinvestment result also applies to this mixed model even if f and g are symmetric.
Theorem 4 Suppose that quality is multiplicative for men and additive for women. If the distributions f and g are symmetric, in any quasi-symmetric equilibrium investments are generically excessive relative to Pareto e¢ ciency.
No Gender Di¤erence Implies E¢ ciency
We now consider the implications of ex-ante heterogeneity, where individuals di¤er even before shocks are realized, beginning with an illustrative example. Assume that the sex ratio is balanced. Suppose that we have two classes, H and L, with fractions H and L in the population. Assume that the marginal costs of investment are lower for the upper class, H. Let c H (:) and c L (:) be the cost functions, which depend upon class but not upon gender, where c 0 H (x) < c 0 L (x) for any x. Let f i (:) and g i (:); i 2 fH; Lg denote the density function of shocks for the boys from class i, and the girls from class i respectively. Assume that quality function is additive in the shocks and investment.
Consider a pro…le of investments (x HB ; x LB ; x HG ; x LG ) where each individuals who belong to the same class and same gender choose the same investment. This pro…le induces a distribution of qualities for the boys,F (q), and of girls,G(p). Since any stable measure preserving matching~ must be assortative, we must haveF (q) =G(~ (p)).
Let x HB ; x LB ; x HG ; x LG be the equilibrium investment levels. Suppose that the distribution of qualities of in both the sexes has a connected support, without any gaps. In class i, the …rst order condition for investment in boys is given by
The density function for boy's quality is given by (that for girls is analogous):
Let the class di¤erences be arbitrary, so that f H can di¤er from f L and g H from g L . However assume that there are no gender di¤erences, so that f H = g H and f L = g L . Consider a gender neutral strategy pro…le, where investments depend on class but not on gender, so that x iB = x iG for i 2 fH; Lg. Since the shocks do not vary between the sexes, the induced distribution of qualities will be identical in the two sexes. That is, for any value q, F (q) =G(q), implying that~ (q) = q. This in turn implies thatf (q) =g( (q)). Therefore the left hand side of equation (20) equals one.
Consider a utilitarian social planner who puts equal weight on each type of individual, irrespective of gender or social class. Since the marginal bene…t of additional investment in a boy is unity, for any girl who is matched with him, such a planner would set the marginal cost of investment to one. We conclude therefore that investment in boys is utilitarian e¢ cient if there are no gender di¤erences, even if there is large heterogeneity between classes. Similarly, investment in girls is utilitarian e¢ cient.
This argument is very general -provided that there are no di¤erences between the sexes, equilibrium investments will be utilitarian e¢ cient even if there is wide heterogeneity within each sex. Assume that there is a …nite set of types, indexed by i 2 f1; 2; ::; ng. Type i has a measure i of boys and an equal measure of girls, with P n i=1 i = 1. A boy or girl of type i has an idiosyncratic component of quality, ", that is distributed with a density function f i (") and a cumulative distribution function F i ("). We shall assume a general quality functions q(x; "), where q is continuous, strictly increasing in both arguments, and di¤erentiable and concave in x, the investment. The cost of investment may also depend upon type, and is denoted c i (x). We assume that Assumption A2 holds for each type, i.e. it holds for each cost function c i and each density function f i .
We assume: No Gender Di¤erence: Men and women are symmetric with regards to costs of investment and the idiosyncratic component of quality. Speci…cally, for any type i: i) there are equal measures of men and women, ii) the investment cost functions and quality functions do not di¤er across the sexes, and iii) the idiosyncratic component of quality has the same distribution, f i , that depends upon type but not on gender.
The assumption of no gender di¤erence is strong, but there are reasonable conditions under which it is satis…ed. Suppose that investment costs or the idiosyncratic component depend upon the "type"of the parent (e.g. parental wealth, human capital or social status), but not directly upon gender. If the gender of the child is randomly assigned, with boys and girls having equal probability, then no gender di¤erence will be satis…ed.
A utilitarian e¢ cient pro…le of investments (x Bi ; x Gi ) n i=1 is one that maximizes the sum of payo¤s of all individuals, irrespective of type or gender. This satis…es the conditions below 8i, i.e. the marginal social bene…t from increased quality must equal the marginal cost to the individual: c
Under Assumption A2, the cost function c i is strictly convex and q xx (:) 0, so that the above conditions are su¢ cient for the pro…le to be utilitarian e¢ cient. Assuming no gender di¤erence, utilitarian e¢ ciency requires that individuals of the same type choose the same investments even if they di¤er in gender, i.e. x Bi = x Gi x i 8i.
Consider now a quasi symmetric strategy pro…le ((x
), specifying investment levels for each type of each gender. This pro…le, in conjunction with the realizations of idiosyncratic shocks, induces a cumulative distribution function of qualities,F , in the population of boys. Since " is assumed to be atomless, and q is continuous,F admits a density functionf , although its support may not be connected if the investment levels of distinct types are su¢ ciently far apart (i.e. there may be gaps in the distribution of qualities). Similarly, letG denote the cumulative distribution function of girl qualities,given (x Gi ) n i=1 . Since stable measure matchings will be assortative, i.e. if a boy of type q is matched to a girl of type (q) if and only ifF (q) =G( (q)): Thus the distributionsF andG de…ne the match payo¤s associated with equilibrium investments for each type of boy and each type of girl. For the pro…le ((x Bi )
) to be an equilibrium, it must satisfy the …rst order conditions for each type i, for the boys and girls respectively:
We shall call a strategy pro…le gender neutral if x Bi = x Gi 8i, so each type of parent invests the same amount regardless of the gender of their child. Suppose that
is gender neutral and is an equilibrium. Under the assumption of no gender di¤erence, the induced distributions of qualities are identical on the two sides, i.e.F (:) =G(:). Thus~ (:) is the identity map on the support ofF (:). The …rst order conditions reduce to
The …rst order conditions for an equilibrium that is gender neutral, (23) coincide with the …rst order conditions for utilitarian e¢ ciency, (21) and (22). Thus if a gender neutral equilibrium exists, it must be utilitarian e¢ cient. Also, if large deviations from the utilitarian pro…le are unpro…table for every type, then it is the unique gender neutral equilibrium.
A pro…le of investments,
, has no quality gaps if the induced distributions of qualities,F (q) andG(p), have connected supports. Large deviations will be unpro…table as long as there are no quality gaps.
Theorem 5 Suppose that there is no gender di¤erence. The utilitarian e¢ cient pro…le of investments is a gender neutral equilibrium if it has no quality gaps, and if Assumption A2 is satis…ed and u is su¢ ciently small. A gender neutral strategy pro…le that has no quality gaps is an equilibrium if and only if it is utilitarian e¢ cient.
The e¢ ciency result applies plausibly to a non-marriage context. Consider a singlepopulation matching model, where quality is a one-dimensional scalar variable. An example is partnership formation, e.g. …rms consisting of groups of lawyers. Theorem 5 implies that one has e¢ cient ex ante investments, even absent transferable utility. While the formal proof restricts attention to pair-wise matching, the extension to matches consisting of more than two partners is immediate.
The intuition for the e¢ ciency result is as follows. Consider a gender neutral pro…le of investments, where there are no quality gaps. Then a boy of quality q will be matched with a girl of the same quality, i.e.~ (q) = q. Thus the marginal return to investment equals the increment to his own quality, and thus private incentives and utilitarian welfare are perfectly aligned.
This result does require the no quality gap assumption, which will be satis…ed if the support of the shocks is large enough, or if su¢ cient similarly between adjacent types so that their equilibrium investments are not too far apart. Interestingly, if there are quality gaps, then there is a tendency to overinvestment, rather than under investment. Let us return to the two-class illustrative example at the beginning of this section, and suppose that the di¤erences in utilitarian investments between the rich and the poor are so large that there is a quality gap. Suppose that an individual boy deviates from this pro…le and has a quality realization that is greater than the best poor boy, and smaller than the worst rich boy. Assume that the deviator is assigned either the match of the former or that of the latter, each with probability one-half. Under such a matching rule, the poor boys would have an incentive to deviate upwards -the rich boys have no incentive to deviate downwards. 14 
A Model with Finite Numbers
We now set out a model with …nitely many boys and girls, where there is uncertainty as to whether there are slightly more boys than girls or the reverse. 15 Thus the lowest quality boy (or girl) will be unmatched with probability one-half. We show that the payo¤s in this …nite model converge to those in the continuum model as the number of participants becomes large. This provides a justi…cation for our assumption in the continuum case, that a downward deviating agent, whose quality is below the support of the equilibrium distribution of qualities, is unmatched with probability one-half. We also show that if the number of agents is su¢ ciently large, there exists a unique quasi-symmetric equilibrium of the …nite model, which converges to the equilibrium of the continuum model as the number of agents tends to in…nity.
Assume that there are 2n + 1 agents, with their sex being determined as follows: n of the agents are randomly chosen, (equi-probably, so that each agent has equal an chance of being chosen), and then a fair coin is tossed to determine whether these n chosen individuals are all male or all female. The n + 1 unchosen individuals are then speci…ed to be of the opposite sex. We assume that at the time of investment, each individual knows their sex, but not whether they were among the n chosen individuals. Thus, at the investment stage, an individual does not know whether boys or girls are in excess.
Suppose that there are`boys and m girls. For simplicity, we assume that quality is additive in investment and in the idiosyncratic shock. Shocks are i.i.d, and are drawn from F for the boys and G for the girls. Agents are matched assortatively in terms of quality, and if`> m, so that there are more boys than girls, then the bottom` m boys are left unmatched.
Suppose all girls invest x G and all boys invest x B . Let Fì (") denote the probability that a boy with shock " is ranked i , that is, there are` i boys with higher shocks. Write E (j;m) as the expected value of the j-th order statistic for shocks for girls. Then, the expected 14 The matching rule can be justi…ed as the limit of a model with a large but …nite number of agents of each type, along the lines of argument in the next section. E¢ ciency can be obtained even with quality gaps if we modify the matching rule so that a deviator is always assigned the match of the next worst individual. This matching rule is formally correct in continuum model, but does not seem to correspond to the limit of a reasonable …nite model. 15 We thank Roger Myerson for suggesting this approach. See also Myerson (1998) for large games with a random set of players. match of a boy when he invests x B + , and his shock value is " equals
The expected value of his match, over all realizations of ", equals,
Assume now that (`; m) 2 f(n; n + 1); (n + 1; n)g, with both these events having equal probability. 16 The bene…t of a boy, when he invests x B + , is given by
The bene…t function B n ( ; x G ) is continuously di¤erentiable with respect to , including at = 0, if f (") = 0 (cf. Assumption A2). Thus, a quasi-symmetric equilibrium (x Bn ; x Gn ) must satisfy the …rst order conditions:
There is a unique solution to the …rst order conditions if n is su¢ ciently large, and this is an equilibrium (see appendix), giving us the following theorem:
Theorem 6 Suppose that quality is additive, and that Assumptions A1 and A2 are satis…ed. For n su¢ ciently large, the game with uncertain …nite numbers has a unique quasisymmetric equilibrium with investments (x Bn ; x Gn ); provided that u is su¢ ciently small. Further, lim n!1 (x Bn ; x Gn ) = (x B ; x G ); the equilibrium investments in the continuum model (cf. Theorem 1).
The proof of this result is based upon the following proposition, which shows that the payo¤ function in the …nite model and its derivatives converge to their counterparts in the continuum model. Let B( ; x G ) denote the payo¤ from investing more, in the continuum model, and let B 0 ( ) denote the …rst and derivative, which does not depend upon x G . Since B 0 (:) is not di¤erentiable at 0, let B 00 + ( ) and and B 00 ( ) denote the second derivatives for 16 Conditional on an individual being a male, the probability that there are n + 1 males is n+1 2n+1 , since this is the probability that the individual is not among the n chosen in the …rst stage of the process determining the sexes. This converges to 0.5 as n ! 1. > 0 and < 0 respectively. Let B 0 n ( ; x G ), B 00 +n ( ; x G ) and B 00 n ( ; x G ) denote the corresponding derivatives in the …nite game.
Proposition 4 For any x G , B n ( ; x G ), converges uniformly to B( ; x G ), as n ! 1. Further, B 0 n ( ; x G ), B 00 +n ( ; x G ) and B 00 n ( ; x G ) converge uniformly to B 0 ( ), B 00 + ( ) and B 00 ( ; x G ) respectively, as n ! 1.
Since Theorem 2 shows that one has generic overinvestment in the continuum case, our main convergence result here, Theorem 6, implies that there is excessive investment when the number of agents is su¢ ciently large. However, exactly how investment incentives depend on population size is quite complex and we do not analyze it here.
Conclusions
We examined a model of marriage with investments that have stochastic returns. This approach ensures the existence of a unique pure strategy equilibrium, in an area where models often have multiple equilibria or equilibria only in mixed strategies. Our main result is that generically investment is ine¢ ciently high. The intuition for our ine¢ ciency result is somewhat subtle -it is not due to the usual positional externality that arises in tournaments, since investments in our context are not wasteful. Investments by boys increase welfare for the girls, and vice-versa. Indeed, when the two sides or sexes are identical and there are no gender di¤erences, one gets e¢ cient investments. However, when there are di¤erences between the sexes, there are some realizations of shocks where boys have a relatively higher incentive to invest, and other realizations where girls have a relatively higher incentives to invest. Each sex gives greater weight to those states where they have relatively greater incentives, giving rise to over-investment. When the sexes are identical, at every shock realization, both sexes have identical investment incentives, which ensures e¢ ciency. Our model also has interesting observational implications. For example, if shocks are more variable for boys as compared to girls, boys invest less than girls. If there is an unbalanced sex ratio, the abundant sex invests more, while the scarcer one invests less.
While formal tests of the Pareto e¢ ciency of investments at the aggregate level are yet to be developed, Wei and Zhang (2011) present evidence that the sex ratio imbalance drives higher savings in China, which is possibly ine¢ ciently high. Similarly, the global boom in the higher education of women is arguably not explained by higher returns to education on the labor market (see Becker et al. (2010) ). While this could be due to women having lower costs, in the form of superior non-cognitive skills, our model suggest that matching considerations from the marriage market could explain education investment di¤erences by sex.
Appendix: Proofs
Assumption A2:
1. Assumptions on shocks: let f (") and g( ) be continuously di¤erentiable with …nite derivatives on their bounded supports ["; "] and [ ; ] respectively. Further, we assume that f (") = 0, g( ) = 0 but f (") and g( ) are otherwise strictly positive on their supports, with
2. Assumptions on costs: let c B (x B ) and c G (x G ) be continuously twice di¤erentiable. G (x) = 1. 3. Assumptions on quality: let q(x B ; ") and q(x G ; ) be strictly increasing and three times di¤erentiable, with q xx (x B ; ") 0,
17 (a) Let either i. q(x B ; ") and q(x G ; ) be additive so that q " and q are constants.
ii. If q(x B ; ") and q(x G ; ) are not additive, then let q " (0; ") = 0 and q (0; ) = 0 and q x" (x B ; ") > 0, q xx" (x B ; ") 0 and q x (x G ; ) > 0, q xx (x G ; ) 0. (b) The value of not being matched is u which satis…es u < q(0; ") and u < q(0; ).
That is, a girl who invests x and who is not matched has total payo¤ u c G (x).
Proof of Theorem 1:
We …rst derive the …rst order conditions as given in (8) and (9). We then show that these …rst order conditions are su¢ cient, and that no individual can bene…t from large deviations. Next, we show that the …rst order conditions de…ne a unique symmetric best response for the boys as a function of the investment level of the girls, and vice versa, i.e. we have well-behaved reaction functions. Finally, we show that these reaction functions cross exactly once, so that equilibrium exists and is unique.
Consider a quasi-symmetric equilibrium where all boys invest x B and all girls invest x G . Suppose that a parent of a boy deviates from this equilibrium and invests x B + in his son. We may, without loss of generality, restrict to lie in a compact interval [a; b] where a < 0 < b.
18 If the realization of the shock for his son is ", the son will hold the same rank in the population of boys as a boy with a shock level , where (x; "; ) is de…ned by the equation q(x B + ; ") = q(x B ; (x B ; ; ")):
For example, in the additive case (x B ; ; ") = " + . Given this deviation, the boy now holds rank F ( ) in the population of boys and can expect a match with a girl holding rank G( ( )) in the population of girls. She would be of quality q(x G ; ( )). (x B ; ; ") has the following properties: > 0; " > 0; "" = 0; " 0:
That is, if the boy who deviates upwards has a high shock realization, speci…cally on the interval ["; "], he will match with the highest ranking girl who has quality q(x G ; ( ")), for sure. Similarly for downward deviations, < 0, de…ne"( ) by the relation (x B ; ;") = ".
If all boys invest an amount x B and girls x G , then the expected match quality or bene…t B( ) of a boy investing x B + , where > 0, is given by
The derivative of the expected match or bene…t with respect to > 0 is then given by
To evaluate this at = 0, note that 0 and , evaluated at = 0, are given by
and (x B ; ; ") evaluated at = 0 is simply ". Since = " when = 0," = " when = 0. Thus, evaluating (26) at = 0 gives us
Thus the right hand derivative, evaluated at = 0, equals the left hand side of the …rst order condition (8).
Turning to downward deviations, < 0, B( ) is given by
If the deviating boy has a low shock realization, in the interval [";"], his quality will be less than the lowest quality in the equilibrium distribution of boys' qualities. With equal probability, he will be left unmatched and have utility u or match with the lowest quality girl. The derivative with respect to a downward deviation < 0 is
Since" is de…ned by the relation q(x B + ;") = q(x B ; ")," ! " as ! 0: Since f (") is zero by A2, the above derivative approaches (27) as goes to zero. Thus, the left and right derivatives exist and are equal at = 0 and give the …rst order condition (8). The …rst order condition for girls (9) can similarly be derived. 19 We now show that the integral de…ning B 0 ( ) is well de…ned (even though 1=g( (")) is unbounded). As in the proof of Theorem 2, we make a change of variables, from " to :
Since f ( 1 ( )) is bounded, as is q and since q " (x B ; 1 ( )) is bounded away from zero, the integral de…ning B 0 (0) is well de…ned.
We now show that large deviations are not pro…table, considering in turn upward deviations and downward deviations. 
, so that no upward deviation is pro…table.
Suppressing most arguments, B 00 + ( ) can be written as
19 In some of our examples, e.g. those with a uniform distribution, the density f is non-zero at ", the lower bound of its support, and the left hand derivative of the bene…t function, (27) is strictly greater than the right hand derivative, (29). Since optimality requires that the left hand derivative of bene…ts is greater than or equal to marginal costs, and that the right hand derivative is less than or equal, there is a continuum of equilibria in this case. We focus in these examples upon the equilibria with the smallest investments, i.e. where the right hand derivative equals marginal costs. Given that our results demonstrate overinvestment, investments will only be greater in any other equilibrium. 20 B 0 ( ) is not di¤erentiable at 0.
Thus B 00 + ( ) 0 if all the three functions q ; 00 and are (weakly) negative. 21 First, q = 0 by assumption. Second, we have
given our assumptions that q xx 0 and q "" = 0. This leaves 00 ( ).
If a) F and G are of the same type (i.e. G(x) = F (a + bx)), then (") is linear and 00 ( ) = 0. Thus, B We now consider b), f 0 (") 0 and g 0 ( ) 0. The expression (30) can be written as
given q = 0 by assumption and d"= = = " . Note that the …rst integral is non-positive, due to our …nding that 0. The …nal term is negative. Turning to the second term, note that the ratio 2 = " is increasing in " because q x" 0 by assumption, f (") is also increasing by assumption, and their product is also increasing. Then, by the second mean value theorem for integrals, 22 there is a c 2 [";"] such that the second integral is equal to
where (c) = (x B ; ; c) and the arguments of and " are similarly abbreviated. That is, we can write the second and third terms of (31) together as The integral de…ning the function B 00 + ( ) can be shown to be convergent using a similar argument as employed for B 0 ( ). 22 More speci…cally, this is the special case known as Bonnet's Theorem, which considers the integral of the product of two functions where one (here f (") 2 = " ) is non-negative and increasing. See for example, Bartle (2001, p194) . 23 We show this stronger result since we invoke this for the proof of Theorem 6.
in (29) as
which is well de…ned on [a; 0) since f ("( )) > 0 for < 0. 24 We need to show that h( ) is bounded on [ a; 0). Since the numerator and the denominator in h( ) both converge to 0 as " 0, by L'Hopital's rule,
is a bounded function the integral in the numerator is bounded. Thus lim "0 h( ) exists since as f 0 (") > 0 by Assumption A2. This establishes that h( ) is bounded below by some number L on [a; 0). Choose u such that [a; 0) . Since the cost function is strictly convex, this establishes that no downward deviation is pro…table.
We now look at the reaction functions implied by the …rst order conditions. We have
so that left hand side of the …rst order condition (8) is decreasing in x B , with the right hand side being strictly increasing in x B due to the convexity of the cost function. Thus, for any x G there is a unique value of x B that solves (8), and (8) and (9) implicitly de…ne reaction functions R B (x G ) and R G (x B ) respectively. Crossing of these functions will represent equilibrium points. We now prove that the crossing must exist and be unique and thus there is a unique equilibrium. We …rst show that the reaction functions are both increasing. Di¤erentiating (8) we have
as x 0 as established above and using B (") = f 2 (")=g( (")). Similarly, from (9), we have
where G ( ) = g 2 ( )=f ( 1 ( )). Now, we show that R B (x G ) and R G (x B ) are both concave. We di¤erentiate (33) to obtain, suppressing arguments,
We can make a similar calculation for R B .
We now examine where these reaction functions might cross. First, we address the case where quality is additive in the shock so that q x" (x B ; ") = 0 and q x (x G ; ) = 0. Then, we can see from inspection of (32) that R B (x G ) = x B , a constant. Further, it is clear that x B > x B . Similarly, R G (x B ) = x G . Thus, the equilibrium exists and is unique.
Second, if q x" (x B ; ") > 0 and q x (x G ; ) > 0 note that now R B (x G ) and R G (x B ) are both strictly increasing and therefore invertible, and also both are strictly concave. Let
be the inverse reaction function for boys. Further, given q (0; ) = 0 by assumption 2, then when x G = 0 the …rst order condition (8) reduces to c 0 (x B ) = 0. That is, we have R B (0) = x B > 0, and Q B ( x B ) = 0. Similarly, R G (0) = x G > 0. Thus, if we consider Q B (x B ) and R G (x B ) on the (x B ; x G ) plane, the …rst crossing point if any (and an equilibrium if it occurs) will be Q B crossing R G from below. Now, as R B (x G ) is strictly increasing and strictly concave, it follows that Q B (x B ) is strictly increasing and strictly convex. Clearly, as at such a …rst point of crossing we have Q . Lastly, there must be at least one crossing, as by assumption 2c on costs and examination of the …rst order conditions we have lim x!x B Q G (x) = 1 and lim x!1 R G (x) =x G . Thus, there exists a unique pair (x B ; x G ) that solve (8) and (9). We have therefore proved the existence and uniqueness of quasi-symmetric equilibrium.
Proof of the Log-Normal Example
Let quality be additive in x B and ", for the boys, and in x G and , for the girls. Let h(") and k( ) be a strictly increasing di¤erentiable functions, such that h(") N ( " ; " ) and k( ) N ( ; ). Letf andg denote the density functions of the shocks, and let f denote the density function of h("), and g denote the density of k( ). The matching (") is de…ned byF
This implies that
The …rst order condition for boys is given by
Let us now make a change of variables, from " to h. SinceF (") = F (h(")), we also have
Changing variables again, back from h to ":
Specializing to the log normal case, suppose h(") = ln(") and k( ) = ln . Thus h
:
, so that (") = " " .The …rst order condition for the boys is
When " is log-normally distributed, the expectation of " equals exp( " + 1 2 2 2 " ).
Let us now consider large deviations. For < 0, with probability 1 2F
( ) a downward deviation will result is being unmatched, and is unattractive if u is low enough. For > 0,
1 . When 0, B 0 ( ) is clearly concave in . So let us consider the case where 2 (0; 1), so that the variance of the log of the shocks in the girls is less than twice that in the boys. A second order Taylor expansion of (" + ) around = 0 yields
for some 2 (0; ). Thus,
and
Assume that c 000 (x B ) 0. Thus the problem is concave in if
This is satis…ed if
In the boundary case where = 2 " the condition reduces to c 00 (x B ) 2: Thus as long as the ratio of the variances is less than 2 and the second derivative of the cost function exceeds 2 at x x B ; the problem is globally concave.
Proof of Theorem 3: Let f and g be symmetric functions around their means," and~ . Symmetry implies that f (" ) = f (" + ) for any . If f and g are both symmetric, then g( (")) is also symmetric around". Further,
is also symmetric around" (") . Finally, symmetry implies that (" + ) + (" ) = 2 ("). Using these facts,
Similarly,
Thus we may write the product of the marginal costs as
By the Cauchy-Scwharz inequality, the right-hand side of (34) is weakly greater than
Thus the product of marginal costs is strictly greater than"~ if
and p g( (")) are linearly independent, so that investments are excessive relative to Pareto e¢ ciency.
Proof of Theorem 4:
Since the marginal bene…t to men of an increment in women's investment is unity, while the marginal bene…t to women from a man's investment is E("), Pareto e¢ cient investments must satisfy
Using the same notation as for the multiplicative model, we may write the product of the marginal costs as
thereby proving the theorem.
Proof of Proposition 2: Existence can be established by following the proof of Theorem 1 except in the case of downward deviations by girls. A girl choosing x g + for some < 0 faces a marginal bene…t of
We can …nd a distribution F (") su¢ ciently dispersed in the sense of the dispersion order (see (12) for a de…nition) so that f ( ) is small enough to ensure that
Turning to the e¢ ciency of investments, we have f (")( + x G u) > 0, re ‡ecting our assumption that the misery e¤ect is strictly positive. Thus, combining the …rst order conditions (14) and (15), we have
Making a change of variables, from to " results in
By the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, it follows that
Thus, c 0 (x B ) c 0 (x G ) > r while e¢ ciency requires equality.
Proof of Theorem 5:
We have established that the …rst order conditions for utilitarian e¢ ciency are identical to the …rst order conditions for an equilibrium that is gender neutral. Under Assumption A2, the second order conditions for payo¤ maximization are also satis…ed at the utilitarian pro…le. Thus if large deviations from the utilitarian pro…le are unpro…table, the utilitarian pro…le is the unique gender neutral equilibrium.
Given the convexity of the cost function and q xx 0, the utilitarian investments x i globally maximize the utilitarian payo¤s, implying
Since each type chooses x i in any gender neutral equilibrium, the payo¤ of to any individual of type i equals the right hand side of (35). Thus if the payo¤ to the individual from deviating to any x 6 = x i is less than or equal to the left-hand side of (35), no deviation is pro…table. We show that this is the case if there are no quality gaps under the utilitarian pro…le, and if u is su¢ ciently small. Let C(F ) denote the support ofF under the utilitarian pro…le, which is connected under the no quality gap assumption. If a deviating individual's q(x; ") 2 C(F ), then his or her match payo¤ equals q(x; "). If q(x; ") > max C(F ), then the match payo¤ equals max C(F ) < q(x; "). If q(x; ") < min C(F ), then the match payo¤ equals
. Thus if u is su¢ ciently small, the match payo¤ is less than equal to q(x; "), and no deviation from x i is pro…table.
Proofs for the …nite case
Proof of Proposition 4: We begin with the following lemma.
Lemma 1 Suppose a sequence of functions h n ( ) de…ned on a compact interval converges pointwise to a function h( ). Then if all h n and h are continuous in on that interval, convergence is uniform.
Proof. Because we have pointwise convergence, …x some > 0, then for any , there exists N ( ) such that m > N ( ) ) jh m ( ) h( )j < . Since h m (:) and h(:) are continuous functions on a compact sets, they are both uniformly continuous. Therefore, there exists d > 0 such that jh m (~ ) h m ( )j < and jh( ) h( )j < as long as j~ j < d. By the triangle inequality, it follows that given any , there exists an interval I( ) around (of size 2d) such that jh m (~ ) h( )j < 3 as long as~ belongs to the interval I( ) and m > N ( ). The intervals I( ) cover the domain of the h n 's and since the domain is compact, there exists a …nite cover. Let I( 1 ); I( 2 ); :::; I( k ) be a …nite cover. Let N be the maximum of N ( 1 ); N ( 2 ); :::; N ( k ). Then if m > N , we have jh m ( ) h( )j < 3 for all , implying uniform convergence.
Convergence of B n ( ; x G ): Recall that B n ( ; x G ) is de…ned in the paper in (24), and B( ; x G ) is given by,
We now show pointwise convergence, i.e. that for any , B n ( ; x G ) ! B( ; x G ) as n ! 1. Fix a realization of " such that " + 2 ("; "). We show that n+1;n (" + ; x G ) converges in probability to ("+ )+x G as n ! 1 (and similarly, so does n;n+1 ("+ ; x G )). Let z n ("+ ) be the random variable the gives the realized rank of a boy with shock "+ amongst the n+1 boys. It thus takes values in the set Z n = f0; 1 n ; :::; n 1 n ; 1g with the probability of achieving rank i being F n+1 i as given above. The random variable [z n (" + ) F (" + )] has mean zero and variance
. Thus, z n (" + ) converges in probability to F (" + ) as n ! 1. Fix z 2 (0; 1) and let [nz] denote the integer part of nz. Then from Theorem 8.5.1 of Arnold et al. (1992) , the asymptotic distribution of
is normal with mean zero and variance
2 , which is bounded since g > 0 in the interior of its support. The continuous mapping theorem states that continuous functions of random variables preserve limits. Then, because addition and multiplication are continuous, n+1;n (" + ; x G ) converges in probability to (" + ) + x G = G 1 (F (" + )) + x G as n ! 1. If " + < ", then n+1;n (" + ; x G ) = u and n;n+1 (" + ; x G ) = E (2;n+1) + x G , and the latter converges in probability to + x G as n ! 1. If " + > ", then n+1;n (" + ; x G ) = E (n;n) + x G and n;n+1 (" + ; x G ) = E (n+1;n+1) + x G , both of which converge in probability to + x G as n ! 1. Thus 1 2 n+1;n (" + ; x G ) + n;n+1 (" + ; x G ) converges pointwise to (" + ) + x G for " + " and to ( + x G + u)=2 if " + < ". It is also bounded -it is a bounded below by u and bounded above by x G + . Thus Lebesgue's dominated convergence theorem implies that B n ( ; x G ) converges to B( ; x G ).
Convergence of the …rst derivative B 0 n ( ; x G ): The derivatives in the continuum and …nite cases, for < 0, are given by: 
As Hoppe et al. (2009) point out, F n i (") = F (i 1;n 1) (") F (i;n 1) (") where F (i;n 1) is the distribution function of the i-th order statistic of n 1 draws. Its derivative (density) is f (i;n 1) (") = (n 1)! (i 1)!(n 1 i)! F (") i 1 (1 F (")) n 1 i f (") = (n 1)F
Thus, the derivatives of n;n+1 (" + ; x G ) and n+1;n (" + ; x G ) are 0 n;n+1 (" + ; x G ) = f (" + )
(" + )(n 1) E (i+1;n+1) E (i;n+1) ; 
+ f (" + )n(1 F (" + )) n 1 (E (1;n) + x G u):
By integrating the right-hand sides of these two equations, we have an exact expression for B 0 n ( ; x G ).
We now show that the expression n E (i;n) E (i 1;n) in 0 n+1;n (a similar argument holds for 0 n;n+1 ) converges to dG 1 (u)=du = 1=g(G 1 (u)). From Arnold et al. (1992, p128) we have,
where p i = i=(n + 1) and dG 1 (p i )=du is the derivative of G 1 (u) evaluated at p i . Now, n E i;n E i 1;n = lim n!1
as p i p i 1 = 1=(n + 1). Finally, from Proposition 4, we know that realized rank converges in probability to its expected value, that is, it becomes degenerate at p i = F (" + ). Thus the summation term in (39) converges to dG 1 (F (" + ))=d = f (" + )=g(G 1 (F (" + )) ).
This leaves one term in B 0 n , the integral of the …nal term 0 n+1;n (see (39)), which we re-write as 1 2 (E (1;n) + x G u)I n ( ), where
(41) De…ne y(") = f (" )(1 F (")) n , so that
I n ( ) =
The …rst term equals f (" ) f ( ")(1 F ( " + )) n , which converges to f (" ) as n ! 1. In the second term, the function being integrated is uniformly bounded, and converges point-wise to zero as n ! 1, and thus the integral also converges to zero. Thus I n ( ) ! f (" ) as n ! 1. Since E (1;n) approaches , the …nal term in B 0 n converges to f (" )(x G + u)=2 for < 0 as in B 0 ( ; x G ). When 0, f (" ) = 0, and the …nal term converges to zero, as in B 0 ( ; x G ). Note also that B 0 ( ; x G ) is continuous in if f (") = 0, since in this case, lim n!1 I n ( ) is continuous at = 0 (the other two terms in the integral are always continuous in ).
Convergence of the second derivative: Recall that B 0 ( ) is not di¤erentiable at 0, but is continuously di¤erentiable at 6 = 0. We have already de…ned B 
Using l'Hopital's rule, B 00 ( ; x G ) on [ a; 0] may be written as 
We now show that B 00 n ( ; x G ) converges pointwise to B 00 ( ; x G ) -an almost identical argument holds for the convergence of B 00 +n ( ; x G ) to B 00 + ( ). First, we show that 00 n;n+1 converges to 00 , given by 00 (" + ) = f 0 (") g( (" + )) f 2 (" + )g 0 ( (" + )) g 3 ( (" + )) :
But from (38), one has 00 n;n+1 (" + ) = f 0 (" + )
(" + )(n 1) E (i+1;n+1) E (i;n+1)
(" + ))(n 2)(n 1) E (i+1;n+1) E (i;n+1) :
Now the …rst term on the RHS converges to f 0 (" + )=g( (" + )) as n becomes large by the above argument on the convergence of B 0 n . Turning to the second term, it can be rewritten
("+ )(n 2)(n 1) [E (i+1;n+1) E (i;n+1) ] [E (i;n+1) E (i 1;n+1) ] :
As proved above, (n 1)[E (i+1;n+1) E (i;n+1) ] converges to dG 1 (p i )=du where p i = i=(n + 1). Thus the above expression converges to f 2 (" + )d 2 G 1 (u)=du 2 , evaluated at u = F (" + ). One can show that the …rst term on the RHS converges to f 0 (" ) as n becomes large using a similar argument as used in deriving the limit of I n . The second term clearly converges to zero. Thus, we have shown convergence of B 00 n ( ; x G ) to B 00 ( ; x G ). Consider the sequence (x Bn ; x Gn ) 1 n=maxfN G ;N B g+1 . Since B 0 n (0; x Gn ) ! B 0 (0) as n ! 1, x Bn ! x B as n ! 1. Similarly, x Gn ! x G as n ! 1.
To complete the proof, we now show that no deviation from x Bn is pro…table for n su¢ ciently large. Recall that no upward deviation is pro…table.
Turning to downward deviations, note that
Since f 0 (") > 0 (Assumption A2), we may choose u su¢ ciently small so that B 00 (0; x G ) < 3 < 0. Since B 00 ( ; x G ) is continuous, there exists d > 0 such that B 00 ( ; x G ) < 2 for 2 [ d; 0]. Since B 00 n ( ; x G ) ! B 00 ( ; x G ) uniformly and since x Gn ! x G as n ! 1, 9N : n > N ) B 00 ( ; x G ) B 00 n ( ; x Gn ) < . Thus, as in the preceding argument for upward deviations, no small downward deviation in the set [ d; 0) is pro…table.
The …nal step is to show that no large downward deviation, < d; is pro…table. In the proof of Theorem 1, we established that in the continuum model, given k > 0; the loss in payo¤ from a downward deviation is at least k j j > 0, which is at least kd > 0; if u is su¢ ciently small. Since B n (:) converges uniformly to B(:), since (x Gn ; x Bn ) ! (x G ; x B ) as n ! 1; and since B n ( ; x G ) is continuous in x G ; 9N : n > N ) B n ( ; x Gn ) c(x Bn + ) < B n (0; x Gn ) c(x Bn ) for < d. This concludes the proof of the Theorem.
